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Penal Impact: Towards a More Intersubjective 
Measurement of Penal Severity 
David Hayes* 
Abstract: The measurement of penal severity is vital to a range of different justifications 
of criminal punishment, not least those that value proportionality. However, despite the 
wealth of material devoted to the measurement of penal severity, there remain critical 
weaknesses in our ability to say that like cases have been treated alike in modern 
(Western) penal systems. This article explores existing measures of sentence severity 
and argues that each is fundamentally limited for the purposes of analysing penal 
severity in practice. It then provides an overview of DQ DOWHUQDWLYH IUDPHZRUN ³SHQDO
LPSDFW´ ZKLFK explores subjective experiences of punishment in terms of both the 
diversity and the quantum of the pains imposed by punishments. It examines some of 
the epistemological and ethical challenges of pain-based analysis, and concludes on the 
strengths and limitations of penal impact, in comparison to the other measures 
canvassed, offering justifications for an intersubjective measurement of penal severity. 
 
Keywords: pains of punishment, proportionality, parsimony, penal minimalism, 
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1. Introduction: Why Measure Penal Severity? 
The attempt to measure the severity of a sentence, that is, the extent to which it is a 
greater or lesser punishment than its alternatives, is a common feature of Western 
criminal justice theory and policy. Whilst there might be any number of political, 
economic and cultural reasons that would compel one to measure penal severity, most 
contemporary measurements are concerned with the justification of criminal 
punishment. Since punishment involves the intentional infliction of unpleasantness upon 
the subject, it is an institution requiring careful political and moral evaluation in 
(notionally) liberal societies that value the dignity of the individual.1  
 Measurement of sentence severity becomes relevant to this pursuit where a 
justification requires the constraint of the penal State within certain boundaries: one 
must know how punitive a certain intervention is in order to determine whether the 
State is being too harsh (or indeed too lenient). In particular, it is central to the accounts 
of: retributivists, and others for whom justifiable punishment requires (some level of) 
proportionality between the seriousness of the offence committed and the severity of the 
sentence imposed;2 advocates of parsimony, for whom penal severity should be limited 
WRWKHPLQLPXPOHYHOQHFHVVDU\WRDFKLHYHRQH¶VDLPVRQµXWLOLWDULDQDQGKXPDQLWDULDQ¶
grounds;3 and penal minimalists who advocate the restriction of penal severity to a bare 
minimum on anti-authoritarian grounds.4 
 In other words, measuring penal severity is a task of no small importance for 
contemporary penal theory, and has been the subject of much academic discussion. 
However, this paper argues that critical gaps remain in our ability to effectively measure 
                                          
1 Hyman Gross, Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique (Oxford University Press, 2012), 7-27. 
2 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (5th edn, Cambridge University Press 2010), ch 4; Andrew 
von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford University Press 1993); cf Richard Frase, Just Sentencing: 
Principles and Procedures for a Workable System (Oxford University Press 2013), an account in which 
retribution plays a more limited (and limiting) role. 
3 Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (University of Chicago Press, 1974), 59-61. 
4 µ$QWL-DXWKRULWDULDQ¶EURDGO\PHDQVµOLEHUDO¶LQWKLVFRQWH[WEXWRQHVKRXOGQRWGLVFRXQWWKHYLHZVRUWKHUROHRI
more radical anti-authoritarians, such as (individual and social) anarchists, whose influence can be felt in 
developments such as the penal abolitionist and the restorative justice movements. Liberals in particular may 
strive for absolute minimalism, as Gross (n 1) does, or may adopt more complex methods of constraining the 
penal State ± hence the commonality of liberal retributivists. cf 3DXO5REHUWV µ&ULPLQDO /DZ7KHRU\DQG WKH
LiPLWVRI/LEHUDOLVP¶LQ$36LPHVWHU$QWMHGX%RLV-Pedain, and Ulfrid Neumann (eds), Liberal Criminal Theory: 
Essays for Andreas von Hirsch (Hart 2014). cf American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice (Hill 
and Wang 1971). 
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punishment, and therefore, our ability (as theorists and as citizens) to critically consider 
the extent to which modern penal systems impose criminal punishment justly. It 
proceeds in Part 2 to lay these out, before outlining several notable issues with each of 
them in Part 3. Part 4 then proposes a new analytical framework for measuring sentence 
severity µSHQDO LPSDFW¶ to resolve some of these weaknesses. The paper concludes by 
noting some of the limitations and strengths of this framework, and the conditions that 
different ends of measurement place upon the means used. 
 
2. Existing Measures of Penal Severity 
7KHQHHGIRUDQDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³+RZGRZHmeasure SXQLVKPHQW"´LVDVROGDV
attempts to calibrate and control the amount of punishment inflicted. As a result, a 
number of different approaches have proliferated. We may distinguish four broad 
categories of types of measurement for present purposes: retaliation; standardized 
deprivation; punishment equivalency; and the pains of punishment approach. In this 
section, I briefly set out the essential characteristics of each of these approaches in turn, 
relying on a few of the most important examples from each category. 
 
A. Retaliation 
Fish has argued that the popular conception of the lex talionis as demanding exact, 
bloody vengeance against the offender is a modern stereotype, built upon an overly 
literal reading of the Pentateuch.5 Nonetheless, it is useful to start with the most basic 
measurement one can use to identify the appropriate punishment of the particular 
crime: retaliation, or exact, tit-for-tat equivalence. For example, the infamous Biblical 
invective demands that µas he hath done, so shall it be done to him: Breach for breach, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth¶6 
                                          
5 0LFKDHO )LVK µ$Q (\H IRU DQ (\H 3URSRUWLRQDOLW\ DV D 0RUDO 3ULQFLSOH RI 3XQLVKPHQW¶   Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 57. 
6 Leviticus 24:19-20. cf CHW Johns (tr), The Code of Hammurabi (CreateSpace Independent Publishing 2013), 
§§196-230. 
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 Retaliation is not an alien consideration to the concept of punishment in the 21st 
Century, as is evidenced by the shrinking but still very much present level of 
international support for capital punishment as a response to murder. 7  Nonetheless, 
retaliation has been rejected in most jurisdictions as simply too crude and unconstrained 
a measurementDQGRQHWKDWVWDLQV WKH6WDWH¶VKDQGVZLWK WKHVDPHZURQJWKDW WKey 
claim to punish. ,IWKHUKHWRULFRIµDQH\HIRUDQH\H¶LVWULWHLWLVQROHVVVRWRUHVSRQG
that µDQH\HIRUDQH\HOHDYHVWKHZKROHZRUOGEOLQG¶8  
 The range of penal severity is therefore increasingly restricted by norms that 
preclude absolute equivalence crime and punishment. Particularly within the European 
context, it became increasingly necessary for penal severity to be measured in terms 
other than retaliation, as the norms around the penal State developed through the 
modern, human rights-dominated period. This general trend forced advocates of 
proportionality to recalibrate penal scales in terms of equivalence, rather than 
replication, such that the most severe sentence attaches to the most serious offence, the 
least to the least, and so, mutatis mutandis, for everything in between. As a result, 
measurement of penal severity became a meaningful task for those who justified 
punishment on the basis of its constraint, and led to the establishment, inter alia, of 
sentencing tariffs that ranked sentencing options in terms of their cardinal 
proportionality (that is, relative to one another). 9  It is out of this context that the 
standardized deprivation approach arose. 
 
B. Standardized Deprivation 
Models that measure penal VHYHULW\ LQWHUPVRI µVWDQdardizHGGHSULYDWLRQ¶calculate the 
severity of a sentence objectively, in terms of some quality of punishment that affects 
every punished offender to at least some extent6RIRULQVWDQFH0DUD6FKLII¶Vµ&ULPLQDO
                                          
7  However, it would be a mistake to assume that death penalty retention in particular is justified (even 
primarily) on the basis of retaliation: see David Garland, 3HFXOLDU ,QVWLWXWLRQ$PHULFD¶V'HDWK3HQDOW\ LQ DQ
Age of Abolition (Oxford University Press 2012); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (Alan Sheridan (tr), 
Penguin 1977), 32-69. 
8 Martin Luther King, The Words of Martin Luther King, Jr. (Coretta Scott King (ed), Newmarket Press 1983), 
73. 
9 Ashworth (n 2), 89. 
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3XQLVKPHQW6HYHULW\6FDOH¶LGHQWLILHVWKHsocio-politically foundational concept of liberty 
(freedom of movement and choice of action) as something that is deprived (to some 
extent) by all forms of punishment. Using this concept, she constructs a quantitative 
scale within which to judge the relative severity of punishments. 10  Similarly, in the 
related but separate field of offence seriousness, von Hirsch and Jareborg proposed a 
percentile scale for measuring the harm caused by an offence in terms of its negative 
impact upon WKH YLFWLP¶V VRFLRHFRQRPLF VWDQGDUG RI OLYLQJ 11  Both metrics seek to 
quantify unpleasantness in terms of socio-economic or ±political indicators that are 
normatively significant to the polity imposing the punishment. Although both Schiff and 
von Hirsch and Jareborg noted that the means by which they assigned severity µSRLQWV¶
to different sentences were relatively arbitrary, they intended to create frameworks that 
could be brought closer to social reality through ongoing research and discussion.12 
 The propagation of metrics such as those advocated by Schiff and von Hirsch and 
Jareborg in the 1990s was not coincidental. The provision of a standardized metric of 
penal severity became increasingly important because of the move in Anglo-American 
penal policy towards treating non-custodial sentences as alternative punishments to 
imprisonment rather than as alternatives to formal punishment. 13  If non-custodial 
sanctions were to work as alternative punishments, then there needed to be a common 
metric that allowed sentencing authorities and policy-makers to determine when and in 
what circumstances various different types of punishment could be substituted for one 
another. Models built around standardized deprivation provided a means of doing so 
logically, although this was not to say that the substitutability of alternative sanctions for 
imprisonment was (or indeed is) uncontroversial.14 Regardless, the general notion of 
SXQLVKPHQW DV µOLEHUW\ GHSULYDWLRQ¶ LV EURDGO\ DFFHSWHG, and uses a concept similar to 
                                          
10 0DUD6FKLIIµ*DXJLQJWKH6HYHULW\RI&ULPLQDO6DQFWLRQV'HYHORSLQJWKH&ULPLQDO3XQLVKPHQW6HYHULW\6FDOH
&366¶Criminal Justice Review 175. 
11 Andrew von Hirsch and NLOV -DUHERUJ µ*DXJLQJ&ULPLQDO +DUP $ /LYLQJ-6WDQGDUG$QDO\VLV¶  
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7KHLUFRQFHSWRIµOLYLQJVWDQGDUGV¶LVWDNHQIURP$PDUW\D6HQThe Standard 
of Living (Cambridge University Press 1987). 
12 Ibid, 3-7, 21; Schiff (n 10), 190, 202-203. 
13 *HRUJH0DLUµ&RPPXQLW\3HQDOWLHVLQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHV¶Federal Sentencing Reporter 263. 
14 Dan M Kahanµ3XQLVKPHQW,QFRPPHQVXUDELOLW\¶Buffalo Criminal Law Review 691. 
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standardized deprivation in which punishments bear objective severity according to their 
(standardized) interference with profoundly important values.15 
 
C. Punishment Equivalency 
Meanwhile, a number of US studies were measuring penal severity on the basis of the 
concept of µpunishment equivalency¶.16 This approach was concerned with evaluating the 
experienced proportionality of different sanctions within (US) penal systems, especially 
between incarceration and its alternatives. As a result, their attention was focussed on 
the subjective perspectives of the offender, and adopted a novel methodology for 
constructing quantitative measures of experienced severity. These studies offered a 
series of preference decisions to offenders, asking questions in the following terms: 
µ:KLFK ZRXOG \RX SUHIHU duration ³X´ of imprisonment, or duration ³Y´ of alternative 
³Z´"¶ %\ ORJJLQJ RIIHQGHUV¶ preferences in each decision, it was possible to identify 
ranges of equivalence: durations of various modes of punishment where offenders 
tended to show no particular preference, suggesting that the two sentences were of 
comparable penal severity. 
 Punishment equivalency was ultimately flawed, however, in its (not unreasonable 
but rather simplistic) assumption that offender preferences were based entirely upon the 
perceived severity of the sentence, to the exclusion of other criteria, such as whether the 
availability of formal or informal support in each penal setting. Although these studies 
demonstrated an interest in the subjective experience of punishment, in other words, 
that interest was limited to what offenders subjective preferences were, and not why 
they preferred particular options ± a question that is vital to an effective analysis of what 
makes punishment punitive, and to what extent. Furthermore, since several of these 
studies focussed upon incarcerated offenders with experience of non-custodial 
                                          
15 )RU D UHFHQW GHIHQFH RI WKLV DSSURDFK VHH'DQ 0DUNHO DQG&KDG )ODQGHUV µ%HQWKDPRQ6WLOWV 7KH %DUH
5HOHYDQFHRI6XEMHFWLYLW\WR5HWULEXWLYH-XVWLFH¶California Law Review 907. 
16  E.g. %HQ 0 &URXFK µ,V ,QFDUFHUDWLRQ 5HDOO\ :RUVH" $QDO\VLV RI 2IIHQGHUV¶ 3UHIHUHQFHV IRU 3ULVRQ RYHU
3UREDWLRQ¶ Justice Quarterly :LOOLDP6SHOPDQµ7KH6HYHULW\RI,QWHUPHGLDWH6DQFWLRQV¶
32(2) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 3HWHU%:RRGDQG+DUROG**UDVPLFNµ7RZDUGWKH
Development of Punishment Equivalencies: Male and Female Prisoners Rate the Severity of Alternative 
6DQFWLRQV&RPSDUHGWR3ULVRQ¶Justice Quarterly 19. 
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penalties,17 participants in those studies may well have under-valued the severity of 
incarceration as a UHVXOW RI µKHGRQLF DGDSWDWLRQ¶ZKHUHE\ VXIIHUHUV OHDUQ WR FRSH ZLWK 
adverse circumstances, so that they them seem less unpleasant with time.18  
 Nonetheless, punishment equivalence studies demonstrated an interest in using 
subjective experiences of punishment to create a µYDOLGFRQWLQXXPRIVHQWHQFLQJRSWLRQV¶
that would gradually build up a (standardized) sentencing tariff more closely aligned to 
the subjective experience of imprisonment than a wholly theoretical model of 
standardized deprivation could provide.19 
 
D. Pains of Punishment and Subjective Suffering 
Indeed, the subjective focus of punishment equivalence studies was a forerunner of 
more qualitative and experiential approaches that have proliferated more recently. In 
particular, the two most recent decades have seen a resurgence of interest in the pains 
of punishment, and in more general accounts of subjective suffering. 
 The pains of punishment have a long history as measures of the sociological 
impact of punishment, particularly in prisons.20 Since the late 1990s, however, they have 
played a greater role in the evaluation of punishment as a penal intervention, typically 
with the attempt of combatting and minimizing, rather than measuring, their impact.21  
 Pains of punishment approaches identify the punitive (or at least, unpleasant) 
features of a sentence with a qualitative and inductive approach, stressing WKHRIIHQGHU¶V
own experiences and the ways in which their punishment negatively affects their life in 
both the short- and long-term. It then uses these experiences to construct a grounded 
theory of the pains that tend to attend a particular intervention.22 The discussion of 
these pains tends to resemble a catalogue, which shows the incidence and variation of 
                                          
17 E.g. Wood and Grasmick (ibid); Crouch (ibid). 
18 -RKQ%URQVWHHQ&KULVWRSKHU%XFFDIXVFRDQG-RQDWKDQ60DVXU µ+DSSLQHVVDQG3XQLVKPHQW¶
University of Chicago Law Review 1037. 
19 Wood and Grasmick (n 16), 16. 
20 Starting with Gresham M Sykes, The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison (Princeton 
University Press 1958), ch 4. 
21 E.g.%ULDQ.3D\QHDQG5DQG\5*DLQH\ µA Qualitative Assessment of the Pains Experienced on Electronic 
0RQLWRULQJ¶ (1998) 42(2) International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 149; Ioan 
'XUQHVFX µ3DLQV RI 3UREDWLRQ (IIHFWLYH 3UDFWLFH DQG +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶   International Journal of 
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 530. 
22 E.g. Durnescu (n 21), 533-538. 
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pains without accounting for the quantum: that is, their relative severity compared to 
one another, and LQWHUPVRIWKHUHODWLYHLPSDFWWKH\KDYHRQWKHLQGLYLGXDORIIHQGHU¶V
life. This limits their utility for the measurement of penal severity, since it undermines 
the validity of any comparisons drawn between different pains and penal subjects.23 
 More recently, approaches to punishment based upon more general subjective 
suffering have proliferated, particularly within US criminology (although their intellectual 
heritage can be traced far earlier).24 This most recent revival of the subjectivist trend 
began with Adam Kolber, who argued that accounts of punishment could not ignore its 
subjectively-experienced social impacts when considering its impact and desirability. 25 
5DWKHUSXQLVKPHQWVKRXOGEHPHDVXUHGLQWHUPVRIWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKRQH¶Vsubjective 
quality of life during punishment GHYLDWHVIURPRQH¶VSUHvious µEDVHOLQHFRQGLWLRQ¶.26 This 
primarily sociologically-informed experiential account was supported by the 
contemporaneous emergence of %URQVWHHQ %XFFDIXVFR DQG 0DVXU¶V (aforementioned) 
interest in µKHGRQLFDGDSWDWLRQ¶ as a psychological response to incarceration.27 
 Both of these accounts have been raised at the abstract, theoretical level, and 
have been subject to strenuous contestation from objectivist retributivists. 28  More 
recently, however, Sexton has attempted to supplement this argument with empirical 
discussion, in order tRµDOORZSXQLVKPHQWWREHH[DPLQHG in situ rather than in its ideal, 
DUWLFXODWHGRUDEVWUDFWIRUP¶29 Sexton uses 80 prisoner interviews to identify a range of 
VRXUFHV RI SDLQ IURP µFRQFUHWH¶ GD\-to-GD\ GHSULYDWLRQV WR PRUH DEVWUDFW µV\PEROLF¶
punishments, such as loss of freedom; the latter being generally experienced as more 
severe than the former+HURYHUDOOWKHVLVLVWKDWWKHµSHQDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶RISULVRQHUV
                                          
23  An attempt at such a comparison is made in Randy R Gainey and BrLDQ . 3D\QH µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH
([SHULHQFHRI+RXVH$UUHVWZLWK(OHFWURQLF0RQLWRULQJ$Q$QDO\VLVRI WKH4XDQWLWDWLYHDQG4XDOLWDWLYH'DWD¶
(2000) 44(1) International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 84. However, their 
approach ultimately fell foul of the conceptual limitations raised in Part 3 below. 
24 E.g., Nils Christie, Limits to Pain (Martin Robertson 1981). 
25 Adam Kolber, µ7KH&RPSDUDWLYH1DWXUHRI3XQLVKPHQW¶ (2009) 89(5) Boston University Law Review 1565.  
26 Ibid; Adam Kolberµ7KH6XEMHFWLYH([SHULHQFHRI3XQLVKPHQW¶Columbia Law Review 182. 
27 Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur (n 18); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan S Masur, 
µ5HWULEXWLRQDQGWKH([SHULHQFHRI3XQLVKPHQW¶ (2010) 98(5) California Law Review 1463. 
28 See Markel and Flanders (n 15'DYLG*UD\ µ3XQLVKPHQWDV6XIIHULQJ¶Vanderbilt University 
Law Review 'DQ0DUNHO&KDG)ODQGHUVDQG'DYLG*UD\µBeyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice 
5LJKW¶(2011) 99(2) California Law Review 605DQG$GLO$KPDG+DTXHµ5HWULEXWLYLVP7KH5LJKWDQGWKH*RRG¶
(2013) 32(1) Law and Philosophy 59, 79-80. 
29 /RUL6H[WRQµ3HQDO6XEMHFWLYLWLHV'HYHORSLQJD7KHRUHWLFDO)UDPHZRUNIRU3HQDO&RQVFLRXVQHVV¶
Punishment and Society 114, 131. 
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UHYHDOV D µSXQLVKPHQW JDS¶ EHWZHHQ their expectations about punishment and its 
experience, ZKLFKDOWHUVWKHµVDOLHQFH¶ (prominence) of that punishment in WKHSULVRQHU¶s 
day-to-day life.30 
 6H[WRQ¶V HPSLULFDO DQG .ROEHU¶V WKHRUHWLFDO SRVLWLRQs share the pains of 
punishment discourse¶Vinductive, experiential approach to measuring penal severity. All 
of the models highlighted here understand punishment as suffering, deriving from the 
orthodox account of punishment as something that is, inter alia, unpleasant,31 together 
with a recognition that pain is both subjectively experienced and incapable of being 
boiled down to a single predetermined metric. Although this qualitative tendency has 
mostly limited analysis to the identification of the incidence and variety of the pains of 
punishment, increasing attention is also being paid to questions of penal severity. 
 
3. Objections and Limitations 
Although each of the models for measuring penal severity sketched above has particular 
uses and advantages, they are also characterized by weaknesses and limitations, which I 
explore in this part, with the aim of demonstrating the need for a more intersubjective 
account of punishment. In particular, two issues, which I have labelled as the problems 
RI µWKH ODZ RI WKH LQVWUXPHQW¶ DQG RI µSUHVXPHG QRUPDWLYH REMHFWLYLW\¶ UHTXLUH
consideration. Firstly, however, I must consider two more foundational problems with 
the measurement of sentenceV¶ severity, raised by Jesper Ryberg.32 
 
$5\EHUJ¶V&KDOOHQJHV: Foundational Issues 
Ryberg identifies three key challenges to retributive reasoning, particularly as regards 
measuring penal severity. Although he does not see these issues as necessarily 
insurmountable, he noted three conceptual challenges, which continue to pose difficulties 
when measuring penal severity: of differences in impact; of delimitation; and of severity. 
                                          
30 Ibid, 128-131. 
31 Ashworth (n 27KRPDV0F3KHUVRQµ3XQLVKPHQW'HILQLWLRQDQG-XVWLILFDWLRQ¶Analysis 21. 
32 -HVSHU5\EHUJµ3XQLVKPHQWDQGWKH0HDVXUHPHQWRI6HYHULW\¶LQJesper Ryberg and J Angelo Corlett (eds), 
Punishment and Ethics: New Perspectives (Palgrave MacMillan 2010). 
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The third, however, only concerns the practical and theoretical ramifications of the 
former two, to which I limit the present discussion. 
 
(i) Differences in impact 
The challenge of differentiated impact is relatively self-explanatory, and has its roots in 
the orthodox definition of punishment DV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW LV µQRUPDOO\ FRQVLGHUHG
XQSOHDVDQW¶33 7KHSUREOHPZLWKD VWDWHPHQW VXFKDV µ,PSULVRQPHQW LV DPRUH VHYHUH
SXQLVKPHQWWKDQDFRPPXQLW\SHQDOW\¶LVWKDWLWDVVXPHVWKDWVXIILFLHQWO\VWDQGDUGLzed 
descriptions of penal severity are possible. But if punishment is (actually or potentially) 
unpleasant then it is an experience, and therefore inevitably subjective. The result is 
that the LQGLYLGXDO¶V experienced pains of punishment will differ from any standardized 
account due to her particular circumstances, attitudes, and perspectives before, during, 
and after her punishment. As Christie observesµ/LWHUDWXUHLVIXOORIKHURHVVRJUHDWWKDW
pain becomes small, or cowards so small that almost everythiQJ EHFRPHV SDLQ¶ 34 
5\EHUJ¶V SRLQW LV WKDW WR VSHDN RI WKLQJV µQRUPDOO\ FRQVLGHUHG XQSOHDVDQW¶ LQYLWHV WKH
measurement of punishment in terms of unpleasantness, which must either be actually 
experienced (and therefore subjective), or based upon a standardization of experiences, 
and therefore more or less arbitrary and inaccurate.35 
 In their defence of retributive objectivism, Markel and Flanders respond to this 
FULWLFLVPE\RSWLQJIRUDWKLUGRSWLRQGHQ\LQJWKDWSXQLVKPHQW¶VVHYHULW\KDVDQ\WKLQJ at 
all to do with experienced unpleasantness, in defiance of the orthodox definition. On 
their account, a criminal punishment is an objective condemnation, whose relative 
severity is absolutely predetermined by the government, as servant of the electorate. To 
account for subjective differences in experience would therefore be to treat the individual 
RIIHQGHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQWKDWRIWKHHOHFWRUDWHDQGWRXQGHUPLQH
the democratic credentials of criminal justice.36 
                                          
33 McPherson (n 31), 21. 
34 Christie (n 24), 9. 
35 Ryberg (n 32), 74-82. &RPSDUH.ROEHU¶VILFWLRQDODFFRXQWRIµWUXQFDWLRQ¶Q25), 188. 
36 Markel and Flanders (n 15), 979-982. This position is only true to the extent that modern (US) (liberal) 
democracy is (sufficiently) representative of the electorate (an empirical claim that is vulnerable, in particular, 
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 However, Bronsteen, %XFFDIXVFRDQG0DVXU¶Vresponse to this argument makes a 
more fundamental, historical point. After all, as they note, if unpleasantness had nothing 
to do with punishment, then one would expect to see suffering and punishment paired 
only intermittently throughout history and worldwide. In fact, however, unpleasantness 
is an ever-present feature of criminal punishment. For example, the deprivation of 
wealth may or may not be described as a punishment in a particular place and time, but 
no penal system has ever called it a punishment to receive additional wealth. If 
condemnation were all that mattered, then such a state of affairs would be possible, and 
therefore its historical absence is significant, suggesting (although not proving) that 
there is necessarily something unpleasant about the nature of punishment.37 
 It must be said that it is specious to assume that simply because something has 
never been, that it is impossible under present or future conditions. Haque implicitly 
raises this point, noting that the basic requirement of a proportionate punishment is that 
it is a satisfactory condemnation, and is effective at communicating censure to the 
offender. Harm is therefore moderately useful, and seems to be necessary in the 
punishment of those crimes that involve the infliction of harm themselvesµ,WLVKDUGWR
imagine any harmless punishment comparable in seriousness to murder, rape, or other 
YLROHQW FULPHV¶.38 In other words, harm is a source of penal severity, but not the only 
such source. Given a plurality of different sources of punitive meaning (including 
objective condemnation and communication of censure), then, his account is that 
unpleasantness may well be required, especially for serious crimes, but it should be 
strictly minimized, rather than doled out proportionately, in order to reduce the damage 
done by the penal State to individuals¶ OLYHV ± an argument with clear moral and 
humanitarian weight, given the moral unattractiveness of a system that intentionally 
inflicts pain on other human beings.39 
                                                                                                                                   
WRWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIHOHFWRUDOFKRLFHLPSRVHGE\WKH86¶VELSDUWLVDQSROLWLFDOV\VWHP The point is not that US 
democracy is necessarily insufficient or illusory (although cf, e.g. 6KHOGRQ:ROLQ µDemocracy Incorporated: 
Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism (Princeton University Press 2008)), but that 
Markel and Flanders beg a crucial empirical question in justifying their normative position. 
37 %URQVWHHQ%XFFDIXVFRDQG0DVXUµ5HWULEXWLRQDQGWKH([SHULHQFHRI3XQLVKPHQW¶Q27), 1471-1473. 
38 Haque (n 28), 77-78. 
39 Ibid, 78-79. 
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 Despite this moral weight, however, it is enough for present purposes to observe 
that Haque has really only brought this debate full circle. Even if one accepts that there 
are multiple sources of penal severity, 5\EHUJ¶V SRLQW DERXW GLIIHUHQFH RI LPSDFt still 
stands, as offenders are liable to respond just as differently to the communication of 
censure as they would to the experience of suffering. A vital component of 
SURSRUWLRQDOLW\¶VPRUDOFODLPWRGR MXVWLFH, for instance, is its ability to treat like cases 
alike, and yet different offender circumstances, attitudes, and perspectives continue to 
lead to the same imposition leading to different outcomes.40 
 The discussion of severity models in Part 2 is framed in terms of the struggle to 
address this challenge. Since the challenge of differentiated impact addresses the claim 
that a monistic standard of severity can exist, it is most challenging to standardized 
deprivation accounts. Punishment equivalency studies, whilst addressing individual 
differences at the level of data collection, nevertheless use those data to construct 
objectivized standards that do not sufficiently account for individual experience when 
establishing equivalences. This deficiency partly motivated the increasing focus on 
qualitative measures in recent decades, but has ultimately gone too far in the opposite 
direction, providing a plurality of recognised pains, but no account of their quanta. 
 
(ii) Delimitation 
5\EHUJ¶V VHFRQG FKDOOHQJH FULWLTXHV WKH RUWKRGR[ DFFRXQW RI SXQLVKPHQW¶V IRFXV RQO\
upon unpleasantness stemming from the intentional acts of a State agent.41 For Ryberg, 
it is simply too difficult to separate out the unpleasantness stemming from penal 
intervention from the corollary effects of that punishment upon the community, and from 
WKH FRPPXQLW\¶V UHVSRQVH WR WKH SXQLVKPHQW 42  This is particularly the case for 
community penalties, where the punishment is undertaken within one or more 
community contexts and where pre-existing pains, marginalization, and deprivations 
                                          
40 Michael Tonry, µProportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of punishments¶ in Michael Tonry (ed), 
Why Punish? How Much? A Reader on Punishment (Oxford University Press 2011) 217±237, 225-229. 
41 McPherson (n 33). 
42 Ryberg (n 32), 82-87. cf Nigel Walker, Why Punish? (Oxford University Press 1991). 
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interact with the pains of punishment.43 So the question is: where do we draw the line 
between an effect of the punishment and an unconnected, coincidental pain, which of 
course presupposes another question: to what extent can we? 
 It is in response to this challenge that recent retributive subjectivists have 
narrowed, and even rejected, the orthodox requirement that punishment be intentionally 
imposed by State agents. In any event, the µLQWHQWLRQDOLW\¶UHTXLUHPHQt is unnecessarily 
restrictive, ruling out as it does much that seems intuitively punitive, such as the 
punishment of oneself, social stigma, vigilantism, and the outcomes of mutualistic 
restorative justice mechanisms.44  
 However, none of the new subjective accounts provide an adequate response to 
WKHZLGHUSRLQWEHKLQG5\EHUJ¶VFULWLTXHZKLFK LV WKDWZH should be able to draw that 
line. To be able to measure punishment we must not only be able to say what it is, but 
also what it is not. Clearly not all that is unpleasant is punishment, so there must be 
some grounds for distinction.45 In rejecting the intentionality argument so completely, 
modern subjectivists substantially reduce their ability to describe the limits of 
punishment, and therefore to measure its severity. 
 However, objectivist accounts do no better, and in particular, struggle to take 
account of relatively indirect impacts of punishment. Standardized deprivation models 
are ill-suited to recognizing the external consequences of punishment even if they do 
extend beyond the limitations imposed by the intentionality requirement. When 
punishment is objectively determined, it is difficult to account for the extremely situated 
impacts of punishment on communities (and indeed, of communities on punishment), 
KRZHYHU WKHFRQFHSWRI µFRPPXQLW\¶ is constructed.46 For this reason, Markel, Flanders 
and Gray adopt the unduly disparaging ODEHO RI µSRVW-SULVRQ EOXHV¶ IRU the unintended 
pains (from the banal to the profound) that punishment can cause to offenders and 
                                          
43  'DYLG +D\HV µ7KH ,PSDFW RI WKH 6XSHUYLVRU\ 5HODWLRQVKLS RQ WKH 3DLQV RI &RPPXQLW\ 3HQDOWLHV $Q
([SORUDWRU\6WXG\¶IRUWKFRPLQJ 
44 McPherson (n 31); Ashworth (n 2), 95. 
45 Feinberg identifies this missing component as censure LQKLVWHUPLQRORJ\µUHSUREDWLRQ¶-RHO)HLQEHUJµ7KH
([SUHVVLYH)XQFWLRQRI3XQLVKPHQW¶ LQ R. A. Duff and David Garland (eds), A Reader on Punishment (Oxford 
University Press 1994; first published 1970), 74-75. 
46 See generally Simon Green, Crime, Community and Morality (Routledge 2014). 
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those around them.47 Whilst not necessarily adopting the same tone, objectivist models 
have shared this difficulty in accounting for the indirect punishment of offenders and 
third parties, with the result that their image of punishment is only partially reflective of 
WKHFRQFHSW¶VEURDGHUPHDQLQJ 
 In sumERWKRI5\EHUJ¶VFKDOOHQJHVto the comparative measurement of sentence 
severity stand, and none of the subjective nor objective approaches discussed in Part 2 
have managed to entirely resolve them. However, before proposing a way forwards, it is 
worth examining two further limitations of quantitative measures of punishment, and 
considering whether qualitative approaches have fared any better. 
 
B. The Law of the ,QVWUXPHQW:KHQ$OO<RX+DYHLV/LEHUW\'HSULYDWLRQ« 
7KH SUREOHP RI WKH µODZ RI WKH LQVWUXPHQW¶ can be summed up by the well-known 
DSKRULVP WKDW µLI DOO \RX KDYH LV D KDPPHU WKHQ DOO \RXU SUREOHPV VWDUW WR ORRN OLNH
QDLOV¶48 The problem with a monistic theory of punishment (i.e. one that attempts to 
describe penal severity in terms of a single standard) is that social reality is almost 
infinitely plural, and cannot be readily reduced to a single metric.  
 Standardized deprivation studies provide the clearest example of this limitation. 
For example, rHFDOO6FKLII¶V liberty-based µ&ULPLQDO3XQLVKPHQW6HYHULW\6FDOH¶49 6FKLII¶V
approach is to focus upon the various effects of punishment upon the right to liberty, a 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHULJKWWKDWLVµVDFUHG¶LQDOLEHUDOGHPRFUDF\50 This right is subdivided into 
a number of impacts upon liberty, in terms of: freedom of movement; freedom from 
supervisory control; economic restrictions; and other stipulations that either negate 
freedom of choice or mandate specific actions. However, each of these is considered 
exclusively in terms of the deprivation of liberty, to which she reduces the broader 
VSHFWUXPRIµTXDOLW\-of-OLIHLQWHUHVWV¶51 
                                          
47 Markel, Flanders and Gray (n 28), 618. Whilst they do qualify this terminology, it is still an unfortunate 
choice of words, given their claim to respect the human dignity of offenders as a matter of foundational 
importance. 
48 Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (Chandler 1964); Abraham 
Maslow, The Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (Harper & Row 1966). 
49 Schiff (n 10). 
50 Ibid, 190; cf Kahan (n 14), 697. 
51 Schiff (n 10), 180-184. 
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 It is worth recognizing the value of the simplicity of this model, which allows for 
relatively straightforward comparisons at the level of both sentencing decisions and 
public policy. Indeed, the primacy Schiff gives to liberty is not unreasonable, given its 
political and cultural importance in the operation of (Anglosphere) liberal democracies, 
and the impact that modern modes of punishment tend to have upon it. 
 However, what Schiff is effectively doing is creating a taxonomy of liberty 
deprivation with which to evaluate sentence severity. The problem is that this taxonomy 
cannot parse that which cannot be expressed in terms of the deprivation of liberty, with 
the result that anything that does not fit into the taxonomy must either be discarded as 
iUUHOHYDQWWRWKHTXHVWLRQRISXQLVKPHQWUDLVLQJ5\EHUJ¶VFKDOOHQJHRIGHOLPLWDWLRQRU
misrepresenting the effect so that it fits the taxonomy. 
 For instance, consider shame, a potent and commonly-experienced pain of 
punishment.52 Whether it originates from conscious efforts at shaming by penal agents, 
stigmatization by friends, family, and the wider community, or indeed from the 
RIIHQGHU¶V critical self-examination, it is difficult to say that shame is not painful, nor 
even something that is µQormally conVLGHUHGXQSOHDVDQW¶ 
 Nor can one say that shame never has an HIIHFW XSRQ RQH¶V OLEHUW\ LW PD\ 
LQGLUHFWO\ UHGXFH RQH¶V FKRLFHV E\ FDXVLQJ one to recoil from social interactions, for 
instance, in order to avoid (perceived) stigma. But that reduction of choices is not what 
characterizes shame, what makes it painful, and ultimately punishing. As a result, the 
LPSDFW WKDW VKDPH KDV XSRQ RQH¶V OLIH FDQ RQO\ EH LQGLUHFWO\ DQG LPSHUIHFWO\
transliterated into the taxonomy of liberty deprivation. 
 Punishment equivalence studies also fall foul of the law of the instrument. Recall 
that these studies make the fundamental assumption that penal subjects will always 
prefer the less severe intervention, with the result that other benefits of particular 
sanctions that compensate for greater overall severity are ignored, which fundamentally 
undermines the conclusions of these studies.  
                                          
52 E.g. Durnescu (n 21), 535-537; Hayes (n 43). 
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 By contrast, pains of punishment approaches avoid this limitation by dispensing 
with the need for a predetermined taxonomy of penal severity. Pain is a sufficiently 
broad concept to incorporate the experiences as diverse as: paper-cuts; bereavement; 
shame; childbirth; poverty; heartbreak; severe beatings; and the frustrations of 
trimming an article WR PHHW D SXEOLVKHU¶V ZRUG OLPLW.53 It can also speak in terms of 
intensification or amelioration. However, the trade-off for this conceptual flexibility is the 
absolute subjectivity of the pains of punishment approach, and its inability to accurately 
and consistently compare individual experiences against one another. Before considering 
attempts to move past these difficulties, however, there is another issue that needs to 
be addressed with standardizing and quantifying accounts of penal severity, which I have 
called presumed normative objectivity. 
 
C. Presumed Normative Objectivity: The Subjectivity of Freedom 
When a particular value (or set of values) is used as a standardized metric, one not only 
assumes that everything you are seeking to measure (in this case penal severity) is 
capable of being expressed through that metric, but also that the values in question bear 
an objective level of normative importance. 7KLVLVDQRWHZRUWK\DVVXPSWLRQDV6H[WRQ¶V
FRQWHQWLRQWKDWµV\PEROLF¶GHSULYDWLRQVDUHJHQHUDOO\H[SHULHQFed as subjectively harsher 
WKDQµFRQFUHWH¶RQHVVXJJHVWs that the subjective valuation of norms is significant in the 
experience of punishment.54 
 There are two specific problems with presuming an objective level of normative 
value for a given metric: one assumes, firstly, that the normative value of the metric is 
uniformly shared within a given community; and secondly, that the normative value is 
shared in the same way. To illustrate the first point, recall the sanctity that Kahan and 
Schiff attribute to liberty in a liberal democracy.55 On their accounts, the importance of 
liberty is defined abstractly, in terms of the socio-political importance of FLWL]HQV¶ 
                                          
53 On the chameleonic nature of pain, see Christie (n 24), 9-11; Sykes (n 20), 63-64. 
54 Sexton (n 29), 120-121. 
55 n 50 and accompanying text. 
PI v.1.3 17 
 
17 
 
individual autonomy. They are free to pursue their own courses of action (until such a 
course interferes with fellow-citizens¶DELOLWLHV to do the same).56  
 However, it does not follow that liberty (or any other right) is equally important 
to all individuals in practice. Free movement and choice will be more important to a 
rebellious wanderer than it will be to a compliant layabout. Both would be likely to object 
to any reduction of their liberty, but that is not to say that they would experience the 
same level of deprivation, or have the same sense of being deprived, even in the 
abstract. Even if liberty is more theoretically fundamental than other human rights in a 
liberal democracy, it does not follow that all individuals will consider the same right to be 
equally important in their lives. It would be an error to assume, on that basis, that its 
deprivation will affect each individual equally in practice. Perspectives, attitudes and 
lifestyles will affect the subjective normative valuation of each right, to say nothing of 
the capacity and opportunity of the individual to enjoy it. After all, freedom of choice is 
not so useful when one uses a wheelchair in a city full of staircases. 
 This leads on to the second feature of presumed normative objectivity: that the 
supposed uniformity of normative value presumes uniformity in the way in which people 
value the norm. Again, this charge applies most clearly to the standardized deprivation 
PRGHOV¶IRFXVXSRQKXPDQDQGRUFLYLOULJKWVDQG (socioeconomic) living standards. 
 Compare, for instance, the following two illustrative statements: (a) ³7KH\ DUH
VWRSSLQJPHIURPVHHLQJP\IDPLO\+DYHQ¶W ,JRWULJKWV"´DQG (b) ³7KH\ZRQ¶W OHWPH 
see my family, and it¶V NLOOLQJ PH´ Both express frustration with a deprivation of the 
right to a family life. However, whilst the first expresses its concern in terms of the right 
itself, the latter goes behind the right, the moral and legal device, to the interest that 
the right protectsDFFHVV WR WKH ORYHDQGVXSSRUWRIRQH¶V IDPLO\ In other words, the 
former treats the right as inherently valuable, and the latter only as instrumental, as a 
way of defending what actually matters. 
                                          
56 This conception underpins the justification of liability in liberal criminal theory: Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy 
Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2013), ch 2; Roberts (n 4). 
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 Once again, the pains-based approach, with its inductive approach, avoids both of 
these issues, at least to the extent that pain is sufficiently broad and pluralistic to 
accommodate the specific valuations of particular norms by individual offenders. It must 
still fit the experience of the offender in terms of pain, which cannot encompass every 
experience any more than liberty deprivation can. 57  However, within these broad 
conceptual constraints, the sufferer is left to express the importance and severity of her 
suffering, and the level at which she feels it, in her own terms. Provided that the 
researcher is suitably considerate of those terms when coding, it is then relatively easy 
WRUHIOHFWWKLVYDULHW\LQRQH¶Vanalysis of the pains of punishment.  
 However, this approach leaves one with a mere catalogue, which fails to describe 
the relative quantum of pains, both between individuals and in a particular sufferer¶V
case. We might be able to say that one or more clusters of pains are more significant 
WKDQDQRWKHULQDSDUWLFXODUSHUVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFHRISXQLVKPHQWEXWnot by how much, or 
how severely that person suffers when compared to others. 
 The question therefore becomes: can the two approaches be reconciled, in a way 
that ameliorates the weaknesses of both? In other words, is an approach to measuring 
sentencing severity that accounts for subjective differences without losing sight of the 
quantum of unpleasantness possible? 
 
D. Pain and its Quantum: Towards a More Intersubjective Approach 
I have spent some time considering the weaknesses of both subjective and objective 
measures of penal severity, since they have received relatively little attention in recent 
discussions of the subject. However, none of the limitations discussed so far are 
insurmountable. Indeed, several scholars (most importantly Ben Crewe and Lori 
Sexton) 58  have recently attempted to bridge the divide between qualitative and 
                                          
57  For instance, the taxonomy of pain cannot properly parse the receipt of positive benefit. Defining 
improvHPHQWDVµQHJDWLYHSDLQ¶LVDVFOXPV\DQGLQHIIHFWLYHDVGHILQLQJVKDPHLQWHUPVRIOLEHUW\GHSULYDWLRQ
DOWKRXJKGHVFULELQJLWDVµDPHOLRUDWHGSDLQ¶PD\ZHOOQRWEH 
58 %HQ&UHZHµ'HSWK:HLJKW7LJKWQHVV5HYLVLWLQJWKH3DLQVRI,PSULVRQPHQW¶(5) Punishment and 
Society 509; Sexton (n 29). 
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quantitative measures of punishment, conceptualising punishment in terms of consistent 
FRPSDULVRQVRILQGLYLGXDOV¶VXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFHV. 
 &UHZH¶VDGGLWLRQWR6\NHV¶SDLQVRILPSULVRQPHQWZDVWRJLYHWKHPdimensionality 
± that is, he differentiates experiences of particular pains by reference to their µGHSWK
ZHLJKW>DQG@WLJKWQHVV¶.59 These concepts are characterized as follows: depth indicates 
WKHµGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKHSULVRQZDVRSSUHVVLYHDQGSV\FKRORJLFDOO\LQYDVLYH¶weight, the 
extent to which prison interferes with and imposes XSRQ RIIHQGHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV60 and 
tightness, the level of penetration of the power relationships typifying prison into 
RIIHQGHUV¶OLYHV, and even their behaviour and modes of thinking.61 
 &UHZH¶V LQQRYDWLRQ LV WR YLHZ WKH SDLQV RI SXQLVKPHQW DV subject to particular 
webs of (formal and informal) authority, relations with fellow prisoners and staff, and 
external control over access to the outside world, all of which contribute to the 
experienced nature of imprisonment. Although his framework is presented without 
empirical data, and so does not attempt to quantify (or otherwise systematize) these 
dimensions of imprisonment in different institutions and for different offenders, &UHZH¶V
account offers a useful heuristic for measuring subjective differences. The theoretical 
taxonomy he proposes is amenable to deployment in future empirical study, and offers a 
basis upon which to build a relatively precise framework for evaluating and comparing 
the severity of the pains of imprisonment (and other penalties). 
 SH[WRQ¶V DSSURDFK E\ contrast, is explicitly empirical from the outset. As she 
QRWHVVXEMHFWLYLW\LVLPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHµSXQLVKPHQWLVQRWMXVWVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVGRQH± 
it is something that is done to people and experienced by SHRSOH¶62 To explore these 
subjectivities, she DGRSWV D IUDPHZRUN EDVHG DURXQG WKH FRQFHSW RI µSHQDO
consciousness': that which is experienced and understood as punitive by the subjects of 
particular forms of punishment. Using semi-structured interviews, she adopts this 
                                          
59 Crewe (n 58). These concepts are taken up and expanded upon from Roy D King and Kathleen McDermott, 
The State of Our Prisons (Clarendon 1995). 
60 Crewe (n 58), 521. Furthermore, at 52&UHZHQRWHV WKDWRQHFRXOGDOVRFRQVLGHUSXQLVKPHQW¶V µEUHDGWK¶
PRUH JHQHUDOO\ H[SORULQJ WKH µGLVSHUVDO RI GLVFLSOLQH¶ LQWR QRQ-custodial fora: cf Stanley Cohen, Visions of 
Social Control: Crime, Punishment and Classification (Polity 1985), 40-86. 
61 Ibid, 522. 
62 Sexton (n 29), 115. Emphasis in original. 
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framework to identify the punitive features of imprisonment, as perceived by prisoners. 
7KHVH LQFOXGH WKH µSXQLWLYH UHIHUHQW¶ RU WKH SDUWLFXODU SKHQRPHQRQ H[SHULHQFHG DV
punishment (a concept that overlaps but is not synonymous with the pains of 
puQLVKPHQWWKHµOHYHORIDEVWUDFWLRQ¶RIWKDWUHIHUHQWWKDWLVZKHUHWKHUHIHUHQWVLWVRQ
DELQDU\VFDOHEHWZHHQWKHµFRQFUHWH¶DQGWKHµV\PEROLF¶WKHexperienced severity of the 
UHIHUHQWDQGLWVµsalience¶PHDVXUHGLQWHUPVRIWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKe experienced 
and expected punishment imposed.63 
 Unfortunately, this rich range of measurements is poorly suited to providing a 
accurate measurement of penal severity6H[WRQ¶VDFFRXQWRIVHYHULW\IRULQVWDQFHLVLQ
WHUPV RI µWKH LQWHQVLW\ RU PDJQLWXGH Rf punishment as it is experienced by the 
SULVRQHU¶64 but no detail is given as to how prisoners calculated this severity, whether 
they were asked to do so in a particular way, or the extent to which HDFK RIIHQGHU¶V
perceptions of severity differed those of others. It is therefore impossible to effectively 
compare the severity of different RIIHQGHUV¶ H[SHULHQFHV 7ZR SDUWLFLSDQWV PD\
experience a particular referent as extremely severe, but without some knowledge of 
their circumstances both before and during its experience it is impossible to say that 
they have been punished thereby by µWKHVDPHDPRXQW¶VLQFHeach individual¶VEDVLs for 
determining severity could be radically different from the other¶V. 
 In fairness, Sexton is not attempting to provide such an account. Rather, she 
aims WR HYDOXDWH WKH GLVWDQFH EHWZHHQ ZKDW IRUPDO DFFRXQWV RI µSXQLVKPHQW RQ WKH
ERRNV¶LQODZDQGSXEOLFSROLF\DQGWKHH[SHULHQFHGUHDOLWLHVRIµSXQLVKPHQWLQDFWLRQ¶65 
However, this position weakens her model as a means of understanding penal severity. 
What is needed is not so much a dialectic interchange between objective and subjective 
accounts of punishment, as one that takes account of subjective differences in 
experience whilst also allowing meaningful comparisons of different pains to be drawn 
between different experiences.  
                                          
63 Ibid, 120-121, 125-131. 
64 Ibid, 125. 
65 Sexton (n 29), 117-118.  
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 Achieving this would not be easy. Indeed, it may be practically impossible, given 
that it requires a considerable bridging of the divide between qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies. However, we can go further than we have so far in identifying the 
subjective characteristics of penal severity, and their impact upon penal severity in 
practice. Doing so would not completely fulfil the transcendental goal of perfect severity 
measurement, but would add to the comparative accuracy, and thus the level of 
(criminal) justice achieved in penal systems that attempt to justify themselves on the 
basis of theories that measure penal severity. 66  I therefore turn to sketching the 
SUHOLPLQDU\IHDWXUHVRIVXFKDQDSSURDFKZKLFK,FDOOµSHQDOLPSDFW¶ 
 
4. Penal Impact 
A. Essential Features 
Penal impact is an analytical framework for the measurement of penal severity in terms 
of the (negative) effects it has upon an RIIHQGHU¶VOLIH67 Such an account demonstrates 
three key features. Firstly, it explores punishment as it is subjectively experienced, 
rather than as it is intended at sentencing. Secondly, it must provide a pluralistic 
account of the RIIHQGHU¶V penal experience, in a way that enables different facets to be 
directly compared without compromising subjective inflections of meaning. Thirdly, it 
requires empirical data, since penal impact is concerned with punishment as it is 
perceived and experienced in social reality, rather than as it is idealized in penal policy 
or philosophy. ,WLVLPSRVVLEOHWRNQRZKRZSXQLVKPHQWDIIHFWVDQRIIHQGHU¶V day-to-day 
life without data drawn directly from their experience, whether that data is qualitative or 
quantitative in nature. The focus is therefore upon developing an understanding of 
experienced penal severity, on the basis of retrospectively-focussed empirical data. 
 Whilst data about penal impact could conceivably be collected by any number of 
different methodologies, the empirical data generated must share certain characteristics 
                                          
66 On comparative value and transcendentalism, see Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Penguin 2010), 15-18. 
67 This is not to suggest that punishment cannot have positive (or neutral) effects in the short- or long-term, 
but rather that these effects are not to be understood as punishing the offender, except where they involve 
shorter-term pains: cf )HUJXV0F1HLOOµ3UREDWLRQ&UHGLELOLW\DQG-XVWLFH¶Probation Journal 3, 17-
18. 
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if they are to be useful for evaluating penal severity. Firstly, since penal impact aims to 
explore both the range and quantum of impacts that punishment has RQRIIHQGHUV¶OLYHV 
any study attempting to explore the penal impact of a particular punishment must adopt 
a mixed-methods approach. When considering the severity of a sentence, it is significant 
both whether it is proportionate (or parsimonious) to a given offence, and how that 
proportionality (or parsimony) is achieved. 
  Secondly, those data must be considered inductively, in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of presumed normative objectivity and the law of the instrument. In other words, 
it must be intersubjective ± rather than suppressing subjective differences for the sake 
of identifying objective trends, penal impact studies must be able to compare and 
contrast those individual differences as rigorously as possible. This is particularly 
important when deploying quantitative methods, which must be able to accommodate as 
fully as possible the lived experiences of offenders into hypotheses at the research 
design stage, and generalizations drawn from the data collected.68  
 Finally, the data generated must be expressed in terms of a base unit of 
measurement (that is, the sine qua non by which penal severity is understood) that is 
sufficiently flexible to avoid the problems of normative rigidity and the law of the 
instrument, whilst also allowing for sufficient recognition of sameness and difference 
between experiences.  
 Such a base unit is available in the concept of pain, which I define in (Nils) 
Christian termsDQGDVLWLVXQGHUVWRRGE\WKHµSDLQVRISXQLVKPHQW¶WKHRULVWVLQRWKHU
words, as an inherently negative, subjective experience, including not only physical 
pains but also psychological torment, emotional anguish, and existential angst.69  
 Where I must go further than these approaches to pain is in accounting for their 
quantum. Such an account is by no means impossible on the basis of measurement in 
terms of pain, which is, after all, comparable. It is possible to say, to return to a 
                                          
68 Indeed, it was the failure of Gainey and Payne (n 23) to do this consistently that undermined the value of 
their qualitatively-led approach. To avoid this pitfall, I would advocate: (a) putting a wide range of variables to 
participants in quantitative samples; (b) deriving those variables from exploratory qualitative research; and (c) 
exploring the quantitative data with qualitative follow-up interviews. Of course, the precise design of any future 
research aiming to explore penal impact should be left to the author. 
69 Christie (n 24), 9-11; Sykes (n 20), 64. 
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previous example, that pain attends (inter alia) a paper-cut, a broken arm, and 
bereavement. But it is also possible to say that the latter two hurt more than the first, 
regardless of the fact that they are entirely different types of pain. Of course, there is 
still a crucial gap in this analysis. Which pain is more serious: the broken arm, or the 
bereavement? On first principles, there is no way to quantify their qualitative 
differences. However, empirical data can help to make such a quantification. Who, after 
all, is better than the subject of pain to tell us how much it hurts?70  
 Such a measurement would hardly be straightforward. After all, oQH SHUVRQ¶V
DJRQ\PLJKWEHDQRWKHU¶VWULYLDOQXLVDQFH71 Any methodology that proposes to measure 
SDLQVHYHULW\DFURVVGLIIHUHQWLQGLYLGXDOV¶H[SHULHQFHVPXVWWDNHWKLVFKDOOHQJHVHULRXVO\
and consider the matter in much more detail than I can in this preparatory sketch. My 
point is that such a consideration is possible. Some generalization may prove necessary 
in the process, but we can bring our understanding of penal severity closer to the 
experienced intensity of the pains of punishment. Such a step would increase our ability 
to reflect social reality to penal policy, and thereby improve our claim to do 
(proportionate criminal) justice, even if it were only partially successful.72 
 Of course, this approach would carry its own methodological and epistemological 
limitations. Before considering these, however, I should briefly confront some of the 
ethical challenges raised by measuring penal severity in terms of pain, a position that, as 
Markel and Flanders rightly note, places one in a morally ambiguous position. 
 
B. Pain Manipulation: Ethics, (Liberal) Democracy, and Measurement 
What I have effectively proposed is to measure the severity of a punishment in terms of 
pain manipulation. 73  One must identify (as fully as possible) the pains attending a 
particular punishment, and calibrate them in order to ensure that they correspond (as 
closely as possible) to the seriousness of the offence(s) in question. The implicit 
                                          
70 Spelman (n 24), 109. 
71 Recall n 34 and accompanying text. 
72 Recall Sen (n 66), making the same point about (distributive) justice more generally. 
73 ,XVHWKHORDGHGFRQFHSWRISDLQµPDQLSXODWLRQ¶LQWHQWLRQDOO\,WVHUYHVDVKRPDJHWR&KULVWLH¶VRZQFRQFHSW
RIµSDLQGHOLYHU\¶DOWKRXJK,VHHPWREHDGYRFDWLQJZHJRVLJQLILFDQWO\IXUWKHUWKDQEXUHDXFUDWLFEDQDOLW\LQWR
the realms of the callous, even gleeful, infliction of pain upon our fellows: Christie (n 24), 19.  
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suggestion is that if proportionality in particular is to be measured in these terms, then 
the guilty deserve not only punishment, but to suffer.74 
 This feature of subjectivist accounts EDVHG RQ RIIHQGHUV¶ VXIIHULQJ is a central 
reason for 0DUNHO DQG )ODQGHUV¶ REMHFWLYLVW VWDQFH. Citing Bronsteen, Buccafusco and 
0DVXU¶VDQDO\VLVRIµKHGRQLFDGDSWDWLRQ¶IRUH[DPSOHWKH\REVHUYHWKDWrecognizing that 
the experienced hardship involved in imprisonment lessens over time seems to advocate 
an increase in overall prison sentence duration, adding to the severity of the overall 
complicity of the State in pain infliction, and further increasing the threat that criminal 
justice poses to liberal citizenship.75 Effectively, they argue, the penal State is required 
WRHQJDJHLQFRQGXFWµGDQJHURXVO\DSSURDFKLQJVDGLVP¶76 
 7KLV LV D IDLU SRLQW LI RQH¶V REMHFWLYH LV WKH PLQLPL]DWLRQ RI SHQDO VXIIHULQJ
Nevertheless, I differ from 0DUNHODQG)ODQGHUV¶ analysis in two key respects. The first is 
that their objection is to measurements based upon suffering, and not upon pain. This 
may seem like an arbitrary distinction, since one cannot have the former without the 
latter. However, their notion of suffering seems to be substantially narrower than my 
notion of pain. The examples that Markel and Flanders raise concerns with judicial 
µPHGGOLQJ¶ ZLWK WKH LQWHUQDO UHJLPH RI LPSULVRQPHQW WR HQVXUH WKDW HDFK SULVRQHU
UHFHLYHVWKHµFRUUHFW¶DPRXQWRISDLQ,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHLUFRQFHUQLV
not with the observation that punishment is generally painful, but that punishments 
ought to be tailored to inflict a specific level of individual suffering (a position they 
suggest could justify or encourage abuses of the scale seen, inter alia, at Abu Ghraib).77 
Their primary concern is that prisons (and by extension, other forms of penal hard 
treatment) would be used for punishment, not as punishments, when principle compels 
us to do the opposite.78 
                                          
74 R A Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford University Press 2001), 20-21; cf John 
.OHLQLJ µ:KDW'RHV:URQJGRLQJ'HVHUYH"¶ LQ0LFKDHO7RQU\HGRetributivism has a Past: Has It a Future? 
(Oxford University Press 2011). 
75 Markel and Flanders (n 15), 982-984. 
76 Ibid, 915. 
77 Markel and Flanders (n 15), 982-984. 
78 See, e.g., Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1, 10. 
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 Whilst this is a valid concern, it only applies to the extent that we require judges 
to inquire into the indiYLGXDO RIIHQGHU¶V OHYHO RI SDLQ. However, as I will argue below, 
penal impact is not suitable for making that kind of proportionality judgement, not least 
because of its necessarily research-intensive methods. Rather it allows us, as citizens 
engaged in a policy discourse, to recognise the fact that all punishment is painful to at 
least some extent, DQGWKDWWKDWSDLQLVUHOHYDQWWRMXGJHPHQWVDERXWWKHSXQLVKPHQW¶V
severity. 79  Doing so provides a basis on which to review the perceived severity of 
punishment, stripped clean of politically convenient euphemism.80 
 Indeed, this leads onto my second reason for deviating from Markel and Flanders 
on the desirability of pain-based severity calculation. Examining a sentence¶V severity in 
terms of pain is not to justify pain infliction, but to identify that which needs justification. 
It is to take seriously what Victor Tadros describes DVµWKHSUREOHPRISXQLVKPHQW¶ 
Punishment is probably the most awful thing that modern democratic states 
systematically do to their owQ FLWL]HQV« ZKHQ DQ RIIHQGHU LV SXQLVKHG KH LV
harmed intentionally. If offenders do not suffer, or are not harmed in some other 
way, they have not been punished, or at least they have not been punished very 
successfully.81 
Even if Markel and Flanders (and other objectivists who deny the need for punishment to 
cause pain, harm, or suffering) can provide internally consistent justifications of 
punishment along retributive (or other severity-measuring) lines, they are poor 
descriptions of punishment as it is currently practiced. 82  It is ahistorical to describe 
punishment as not involving pain, given its emergence (at least in the Anglo-American 
tradition) as a replacement for private systems of vendetta, as Christian, monarchical 
traditions supplanted (and therefore had to provide a valid alternative to) the Lex Salica 
                                          
79 McNeill (n 67). 
80 Christie (n 23), 100-101; Cohen (n 60), 266-267. 
81 Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2011), 1. 
82 This is not to say that there is no role for purely normative theories of punishment. Compare, e.g., Anthony 
'XII¶VSXUSRVHIXOO\XWRSLDQSUHVHQWDWLRQRIKLVµFRPPXQLFDWLYH¶DVSLUDWLRQVLQ5$'XIIµ3UREDWLRQ3XQLVKPHQW
DQG5HVWRUDWLYH-XVWLFH6KRXOG$OWUXLVPEH(QJDJHGLQ3XQLVKPHQW"¶3) 42(2) The Howard Journal 181, 
especially at 192-194. 
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blood-feud.83 Moreover, it is socially myopic to contend that modern punishment has 
escaped these historical trappings, and moved solely to the realm of abstract, civic 
condemnation. To do so is to ignore the wealth of sociological, criminological and 
penological literature on the pains, harms, rights infringements, and other issues arising 
out of punishment.84 Thus, the definition of punishment has always involved at least 
some recognition of the infliction of pain (usually through the objectivised euphemism of 
WKLQJV µQRUPDOO\ FRQVLGHUHG XQSOHDVDQW¶85 It is my central contention that, by taking 
account of the effect that the subjective impact of punishment has upon those subject to 
it, we can make this recognition more effectively. 
 However, the upshot of the claim that we should measure penal severity in terms 
of pain in order to better identify that which requires justification is ultimately political, 
rather than social or historical. Like Markel and Flanders, I am concerned with measuring 
penal severity for evaluative purposes: to examine the severity of sentences that have 
been imposed, rather than setting out a framework for the imposition of future 
sentences proportionately. But precisely because we are concerned with the evaluation 
of penal policy and practice, it will not do to ignore the pains that regularly attend, and 
indeed, are often inherent features of modern criminal justice. 86  That is to evade 
7DGURV¶V µSUREOHPRISXQLVKPHQW¶E\SUetending that it does not exist, in denial of the 
sociological evidence.87 
 A concern with subjective pain improves academic capacity to engage with the 
brute horror of State punishment. Criminal justice is (and always should be) morally 
disturbing to any observer that values human dignity. If we are to convincingly justify 
punishment (as it is rather than as it should be) then we must defend those disturbing 
                                          
83 $ODQ +DUGLQJ µ7KH 2ULJLQV RI WKH &ULPH RI &RQVSLUDF\¶   Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society 89; Patrick Wormald, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, Vol One: 
Legislation and its Limits (Blackwell 1999), 39-40, 311-312. We might extend this analysis to jurisdictions 
which derive their penal institutions from their colonial British past, such as the USA: see Markus D Dubber, 
µ)RXQGDWLRQVRI6WDWH3XQLVKPHnt in Modern Liberal Democracies: Towards a Genealogy of American Criminal 
/DZ¶LQ5$'XIIDQG6WXDUW3*UHHQHGVPhilosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 
2011). However, other penal traditions are beyond the scope of this particular analysis. 
84 There are too many such accounts to discuss, although many of the other references I supply herein raise 
valid examples. However, cf Gross (n 1), 7-27, for an ethical overview of some of the core issues. 
85 Recall McPherson (n 31); Feinberg (n 45). 
86 Markel and Flanders (n 15), 949-952 explicitly pursue this evaluative aim, despite their staunch objectivist 
insistence on direct intentionality. It is the adoption of this level of analysis that renders their naïve conception 
RIDEVWUDFWOLEHUW\GHSULYDWLRQPRUHSUREOHPDWLFWKDQVD\'XII¶VQ82) communicative utopia. 
87 Recall n 81 and accompanying text. 
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features, rather than ignoring them. Retributivism has attempted a number of these 
justifications: that punishment is made appropriate by the equally horrific behaviour of 
the offender (i.e. the punishment fits the crime); that some response is better than no 
response; 88  that pain manipulation expresses socio-political censure, whether to the 
offender or the wider community; 89  and possibly, that the proportionate, calibrated 
infliction of pain is less sadistic overall than the alternatives (i.e. penal minimalism).  
 Regardless of how convincing these justifications are, the point is that any 
attempt to justify the imposition of criminal punishment must confront criminal justice as 
it is, rather than as we might wish it to be. If conditions in the penal system are 
µGDQJHURXVO\DSSURDFKLQJVDGLVP¶WKHQZHRXJKWWREHDZDUHRILWQRWOHDVWEHFDXVH, as 
citizens of (at least notional) democracies, we bear at least some responsibility for the 
shape of criminal liability and justice.90 But we cannot do that if we shy away from 
engagement with the sociological characteristics of punishment ± which is exactly what 
an exclusively objective and abstract engagement with intended liberty deprivation 
proposes.91 
 
C. Penal Impact: A Preliminary Overview 
 In sum, penal impact measures penal severity in terms of the incidence and 
magnitude of the pains of punishment. Those pains are identified and schematised by a 
programme of empirical research, which is used to evaluate the success with which the 
pain delivered by the sentence is calibrated to the seriousness of the offence. Doing so 
takes the problem of punishment in a liberal society seriously, by recognizing the 
negative consequences attending punishment (at least as it is currently imposed in 
Western democracies), and demanding their careful justification. Indeed, it enables a 
                                          
88  E.g. Andrew von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness or Dangerousness in the Sentencing of 
Criminals (Manchester University Press 1986), 48. cf Gross (n 84), 1-6; this argument is not the sole preserve 
of retributivists! 
89 Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions 2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVFI'XII¶VQ74µFRPPXQLFDWLYH¶
approach, which, if not straightforwardly retributive, at least carries distinctive retributive stigmata. 
90 E.g. $OLFH5LVWURSKµ5HVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKH&ULPLQDO/DZ¶LQ5$'XIIDQG6WXDUW3*UHHQHGVPhilosophical 
Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
91 %DUEDUD+XGVRQPDNHVWKLVSRLQWPRUHJHQHUDOO\LQKHUFULWLTXHRIWKHSULPDF\DIIRUGHGWRµOHJDOUHDVRQLQJ¶
over sociological modes of enquiry in legal and penal theory. See, e.g.%DUEDUD+XGVRQµ3XQLVKLQJWKH3RRU
'LOHPPDVRI-XVWLFHDQG'LIIHUHQFH¶ LQ:LOOLDP&+HIIHUQDQDQG-RKQ.OHLQLJFrom Social Justice to Criminal 
Justice: Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2000). 
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closer recognition of those consequences as they are subjectively experienced, whilst 
also allowing for their effective comparison with one another. 
 
5. The Uses of Penal Impact: Of Metrics, Means, and Ends 
This is not, however, to say that penal impact provides a perfect account of penal 
severity. I therefore close this piece by identifying some of thLVDSSURDFK¶V limitations, 
and identifying three contexts in which a more intersubjective account, however limited, 
would enrich penal discourse. 
 
A. What Penal Impact Cannot Tell Us: Some Limitations and Qualifications 
The broad research design I have advocated carries with it a number of inherent 
limitations.92 In particular, analysis based upon penal impact is very research-intensive, 
requiring a great deal of time and resources to reach firm conclusions about experienced 
penal severity. Moreover, it can only provide retrospective data about how painfully 
punishments have been experienced. Information about how punishments will be 
experienced can only be extrapolated, and could never be perfectly predicted, given the 
unique personal circumstances and perspectives of each individual offender.  
 Kolber pre-empts this limitation by considering the abstract example of a wealthy 
and a destitute person who have committed, for the sake of the argument, exactly 
identical offences. Does a subjective position not commit us to punish the wealthy 
person for a shorter period than the destitute one, given that the material conditions of 
punishment will reduce WKH ULFK SHUVRQ¶V TXDOLW\ RI OLIH more sharply? Ultimately, he 
concludes that we should not, since we cannot stereotype the experience of all wealthy 
and all impoverished offenders by dint of a single qualifying characteristic, no matter 
how significant it is to their socioeconomic wellbeing.93 To use another example, one 
would expect an offender who has dependent children with whom she lives to experience 
pain as a result of separation from them through incarceration. However, it is quite 
                                          
92 In addition to the practical limitations that bedevil any empirical research during data generation. 
93 Kolber (n 25), 1598-1600. 
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impossible to predict how much pain she will suffer. We could not use penal impact to 
predict how painful particular punishments will be in practice, in other words. 
 The upshot is that this approach would be of little use to sentencing authorities in 
assigning particular sentences to individual offenders. Any guidance that could be given 
would be liable to at least as many problems as those I have identified in the foregoing 
sections. However, this reflects the focus of penal impact as an analytical framework: on 
the substantive nature of punishment as it is experienced, so that it can be critically 
justified, rather than as it is intended in the courtroom.  
 It is worth emphasizing this point. Each of the models I have dismissed above are 
not (necessarily) inherently weak methods of determining penal severity, so much as 
they are limited as means for certain ends. In particular, much of the discussion around 
standardized deprivation models and punishment equivalencies is specifically concerned 
with ordinal proportionality: the treatment of like cases alike at the point of sentencing.94 
Focus upon different levels of penal policy ± legislation, sentencing, and implementation 
± will produce different levels of specialization to each level, and therefore limitation as a 
means of exploring other levels of enquiry. This does not invalidate the model itself; 
rather, it reduces the utility of that model for broader purposes. With this in mind, I 
close this piece with a consideration of what penal impact can contribute to discourse 
around severity. 
 
B. What Penal Impact Can Tell Us: Policy, Custody and Democracy 
Given the evaluative focus of penal impact, its principal utility rests in allowing 
exploration of the extent to which penal policy arrangements have produced cardinal 
proportionality in the cases under study ± that is, that the punishment has fit those 
crimes.95 Such an analysis offers two key advantages at the policy level: firstly, it allows 
for more nuanced penal policy; and secondly, it improves the democratic accountability 
of the penal system. Let us consider each issue in turn. 
                                          
94 E.g. Schiff (n 10); Wood and Grasmick (n 16), 16. Von Hirsch and Roberts (n 11) are concerned with the 
RWKHUVLGHRIWKHµHTXDWLRQ¶± that is, with offence seriousness ± but they are still concerned with providing a 
tool to guide sentencing practice. 
95 Ashworth (n 2), 89-90. 
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 Firstly, greater recognition of both the plurality of pains and their quanta would 
improve political understanding of what punishment has entailed for particular samples 
of offenders. This could be used to refine our understanding of: which pains count as 
punishments; which factors affect their relative severity in which circumstances; and 
therefore how effective various forms of punishment are qua punishment. In particular, 
non-custodial options would benefit from a fairer representation of their punitive 
capacities, given the necessary shift in focus away from a metric of punishment based 
around liberty deprivation and towards a greater recognition of the punitive capacity of 
other types of pain that this would necessarily entail. 
 This, in turn, would allow the construction of sentencing tariffs that more closely 
correspond to experienced reality, sentencing guidelines that recognise more effectively 
a range of aggravating and mitigating circumstances based around (or at least, 
influeQFHGE\DPRUHµVRFLRORJLFDO¶UHDGLQJRIKRZWKHpunishment is likely to be felt,96 
and criminal justice policies more reflective of the painful nature of criminal punishment 
and the need for both executive constraint and legislative restraint as regards the penal 
State. 
 The second, democratic justification for the pursuit of an analysis of penal 
severity on the basis of penal impact (or some other measure of pain manipulation) 
follows on from this point. The claim that a focus on pain manipulation would encourage 
penal restraint might seem rather utopian, given the well-documented issue of populist 
punitiveness in modern (Western) democracies. As a result of this phenomenon penal 
restraint becomes tantamount to political suicide due to the apparent desire of the public 
IRUDµWRXJK¶SXQLWLYHDJHQGD97  
 However, a closer analysis of what the public wants from criminal justice (and 
therefore what they will vote for), suggests that their outlook is far from 
straightforwardly punitive. In particular, whilst condemnation and punishment are 
                                          
96 Hudson (n 91). 
97 Nicola Lacey, 7KH 3ULVRQHUV¶ 'LOHPPD 3ROLWLFDO (FRQRP\ DQG 3XQLVKPHQW LQ &RQWHPSRUDU\ 'HPRFUDFLHV 
(Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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FRPPRQUHIHUHQWVIRUPHPEHUVRIµWKH¶SXEOLFKRZHYHUFRQVWUXHG98 when asked about 
criminal justice, individual citizens are also more willing to recognize reparation and 
rehabilitation as desirable end goals, especially when furnished with the facts of 
individual cases.99 In other words, the presumption of the inherent punitiveness of the 
populace potentially overreaches itself, and is difficult to put to the test in (at least) the 
Anglo-Welsh context, where the substantial agreement between the major political 
parties in the United Kingdom as to the best course of action makes the claim that 
voters will only vote in favour of punitive policies a rather self-fulfilling prophecy.100 
 This is not to dismiss populist punitiveness as a problem for minimalist 
penologists. Rather it is to note that a combination of factors tend to preclude laypersons 
from developing an informed opinion of criminal justice, including a sensationalized and 
selective representation of crime (and therefore, punishment) in mass media,101 and a 
general lack of interest in the everyday realities of criminal and penal practice, compared 
with other aspects of public policy.102 
 7KLV SUHVHQWV D SUREOHP IRU WKH 8.¶V GHPRFUDWLF FUHGHQWLDOV DW OHDVW RQ RQH
definition of democracy. Dalton, for instance, perceives democracy as involving not just 
the act of voting in elections and referenda, but as a broader process of individual 
engagement with civic life. He lists a number of essential criteria for ideal-typical 
democracy, the most important of which is that democratic opinion is informed, that is, 
that the electorate are (sufficiently) aware of what they are voting for to be able to make 
a (sufficiently) rational decision as to who to support.103 Absent such information, , the 
democratic claim to political legitimacy ± we are doing what voters want ± is undermined 
to at least some extent EHFDXVH WKH HOHFWRUDWH¶V FRQVHQW to particular policies is 
                                          
98 Shadd Maruna DQG $QQD .LQJ µ6HOOLQJ WKH 3XEOLF RQ 3UREDWLRQ %H\RQG WKH %LE¶   Probation 
Journal 337. 
99 6KDGG0DUXQDDQG$QQD.LQJµ3XEOLF2SLQLRQDQG&RPPXQLW\3HQDOWLHV¶LQ$QWKRQ\%RWWRPV6XH5H[DQG
Gwen Robinson (eds), Alternatives to Imprisonment: Options for an Insecure Society (Willan 2004). 
100 Lacey (n 97), 173. 
101 &ODLUH:DUGOHµ&ULPH5HSRUWLQJ¶LQ%RE)UDQNOLQHGPulling Newspapers Apart: Analysing Print Journalism 
(Routledge 2008). 
102 0DULD <YRQQH)HLO]HU µ&ULPLQRORJLVWV0DNLQJ1HZV" 3URYLGLQJ )DFWXDO ,QIRUPDWLRQ RQ&ULPH DQG&ULPLQDO
-XVWLFHWKURXJKD:HHNO\1HZVSDSHU&ROXPQ¶Crime Media Culture 285, 286-294. Note that Feilzer 
does not allege a lack of interest in crimes themselves, as compelling moral dramas. 
103 Russell J Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies (6th 
edn, CQ Press 2014), 15-36. 
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insufficiently informed. 7KHUHIRUH LI RXU DLP LV WR EH µGHPRFUDWLF¶ ZH VKRXOG DLP WR
improve the level of knowledge that citizens have about criminal justice (and, in this 
case, sentencing severity). 
 Penal impact (or something very much like it) offers a genuine opportunity to 
improve the calibre of public discourse about penal policy, both in terms of the 
alternation agenda (which aims at reducing the use of imprisonment by producing less 
inhumane alternatives) and of the penal minimalist agenda (which aims at reducing 
State reliance upon criminal justice at all). By highlighting the brutality of pain infliction, 
DQGFKDOOHQJLQJWKHGLVFRXUVHRIHXSKHPLVPDQGµVRIWQHVV¶DQ\IRFXVRQWKHSDLQDVD
metric of punishment encourages a more forthright discussion of the benefits (and 
substitutability) of particular punishments, and of the very act of punishment. It is one 
thing to say that the public are in favour of ever more punitive responses to crime when 
punishment is measured in terms of abstract liberty deprivation. It is quite another to 
say that they are in favour of inflicting ever more pain.104 By placing this aspect of 
criminal punishment in full view, analyses of penal impact would invite public debate on: 
the virtues and vices of punishment as a political, social and moral response to particular 
forms of activity; the effectiveness of alternatives to imprisonment as punishments in 
their own rights; and the desirability of punishment for at least some offenders and 
offences in the first place. If only because it would make criminal punishment seem less 
comfortable a moral proposition for an act the State takes on behalf of its electorate, 
such a development would encourage much more discussion of how inevitable criminal 
punishment is, and what form it should take where it is imposed. 
 Of course, such debate would not be unidirectional, and would not lead overnight 
to some sort of progressive penal utopia (even assuming one can have a utopia that 
requires the intrusive forcefulness of criminal punishment at all). Indeed, merely 
presenting the findings of penal impact studies through imperfect channels, such as 
mass media would be unlikely to have much effect whatsoever. 105  What would be 
                                          
104 Christie (n 24), 100-101. 
105 Feilzer (n 102). 
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required would be a greater academic engagement in public and political discourse 
(subject to the need for academic impartiality), which is far easier said than done. 
However, it is reasonable to examine criminal punishment in a public forum, and to ask 
³WKHSXEOLF´ZKHWKHUDQGWRZKDWH[WHQWWKH\DUHVDWLVILHGZLWKWKHSDLQVLQIOLFWHGLQWKHLU
name, and on their behalf.106 If this can be used to improve the capacity of penal politics 
(and therefore penal policy) to reflect the experienced realities of imprisonment, then for 
all its potential limitations, penal impact would be a step in the right direction, and a 
useful addition to our arsenal of frameworks within which to measure penal severity. 
                                          
106 Recall Ristroph (n 90).  
